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quotations with them.GOVERNING THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY
"Transition is a bridge, therefore do not dwell upon it"
1
INTRODUCTION
After an initial burst of euphoria, transition economics, as the most recent child
of our discipline, seems to follow the tradition of the mainstream: it is indeed
becoming a dismal science. While political economists have multiplied the
attacks against "cook-book-capitalism"
2 mainstream advisers in Central and
Eastern Europe and academic research institutions alike have suddenly
discovered the role of "institutions" to explain, why things have developed so
much worse than expected.
3 For some this has focused the debate on specific
reform deficiencies (Begg and Portes, 1992; Buch and Schmieding, 1992;
Schmieding, 1993a). This, if anything, amplifies the role of government in the
transition, while in no way contradicting the consensus around a broad set of
initial reforms. However, the rescue found with institutional economics has led a
number of economists to eschew any comprehensive reform plan. In the light of
historical evidence for the slowness of institutional evolution (North, 1990;
1992) a gradual reform strategy is perceived to be naturally first best, and
governments are advised to take a conservative and cautious trial and error
approach to economic policy in the transition (Murrell, 1991; 1992; Etzioni,
1991).
4
It is indeed ironic that neo-classical prescriptions are now being criticised not so
much for involving too much market and too little state, but for neglecting
government failures and societal inertia in prescribing the appropriate medicine
for emerging market economies (EMEs) (see for instance Csaba, 1992a). While
it is one thing to interpret the output falls in transition economies as a process of
necessary and to a certain degree unavoidable "creative distruction" (Gomulka,
1 Chinse saying, quoted in Benacek. (1992, p. 31).
2 See Neuber (1993) for a very good summary. Also Killick and Stevens (1992); Przeworski
(1991); Roland (1992).
3 This author is no exception. See Raiser (1992).
4 Such considerations are based on the presumption of inherent inflexibility in human
behaviour and hence rising transactions costs if the rules governing economic exchange
should be suddenly replaced. This is empirically untenable (Neuber, 1993) and further
confuses the aims and constraints of economic transition. But even second best arguments
for gradualism, taking into account political opposition and administrative bottlenecks,
founder if the credibility of economic reforms is recognised as a necessary condition for
sustainability and success (Funke, 1993).1991), it is quite another to rely on the dynamism of the Schumpeterian
entrepreneur alone to generate economic recovery (Murrell, 1991; 1992). This
line of argument seems to forget that the very nature of the transformation crisis
resides with the limited scope and role of capitalist private enterprises. The call
for a reduction of entry barriers for small businesses is welcome (e.g.
McDermott and Mejstrik, 1992), but it doesn't relieve the problem of what to do
with the legacy of inefficient, giant state owned enterprises (SOEs).
5 Seen in this
light the advocation of trial and error as an economic policy programme sounds
worryingly like another round of one step forward, two steps back reforms,
which so characteristically failed in the period before the revolutions of 1989.6
Janos Kornai has perceptively analysed the reasons for industrial inefficiency in
planned economies. His concept of soft budget constraints is central to any
explanation of the current transformation process in Central and Eastern Europe
(see Raiser, 1992; Kornai, 1993). It stresses the fundamental role of incentives
for managers and workers in SOEs to behave according to market signals. Its
premise is that, although conceited efforts should go into the rapid privatisation
of the large scale industrial sector, the process of creating new property rights is
necessarily slow (see also Csaba, 1992b). This means that governments in EMEs
face a major task in monitoring the behaviour of SOEs until privatisation and
creating incentive structures conducive to minimal friction in industrial
adjustment. From this perspective we can endorse those contributions from the
institutional economics literature that focus on how to reduce transactions costs
during the transition (e.g. Buch, 1993; Heinrich, 1993) and how to fill the
institutional void left under the ruins of the centrally planned economy
(Schmieding, 1993b). The fundamental conclusion is that the state must organise
its own retreat.
7
This paper seeks empirical evidence to support the above contention. Thereby it
capitalises on emerging differences in the reform strategies of the three countries
already well into the second stage of economic transformation. Specifically, the
Czech experience of low unemployment and remarkable price stability in
contrast to both Poland and Hungary raises the question, whether this may be
attributed to government policy, its late start in the transition process, or whether
5 For all creative destruction, most of these firms are still alive. Slow decay would thus be a
better descriptive term.
6 For a discussion of the reasons for failure see the extensive publications by Kornai (1980;
1986; 1992a). Also Brusz (1992).
' This may place a heavy weight on the commitment of policy makers as they have to cut
through the variety of conflicting interests within the public sector.exogenous factors and initial conditions are more important. On the other hand,
the Hungarian reform path seems to be closest to the gradualist
recommendations (Hare and Revesz, 1992). But Hungary also has pioneered the
experience with strict bankruptcy enforcement and a number of other
institutional reforms. It is thus of interest to relate its policy design to its
economic performance, especially over 1992. The underlying aim of the com-
parison is to address the interrelated questions of whether microeconomic
adjustment in the enterprise sector has taken place in each respective country
and at what macroeconomic cost. ^
The following section briefly reviews economic developments in
Czechoslovakia and Hungary until the end of 1992.
8 This leads to the
formulation of three opposing hypotheses that may~account for the observed
differences in those two countries in particular. The third and fourth section
investigate these hypotheses by first attempting an explanation for the Czech
"miracle" of low inflation and low unemployment and then contrasting financial
developments in Czechoslovakia to those in Hungary. The role of government
policy is stressed although exogenous factors are found to play some role. The
fifth section concludes in drawing the lessons from the Czech and Hungarian
cases and outlining the ways in which governments can positively influence
incentive structures in the transition to a market economy.
II. An Overview of Economic Reforms in Czechoslovakia and Hungary
a) Czechoslovakia
The Czechoslovak communists fell last in Central Europe. After the "velvet
revolution" of November 1989, the new democratic federal government elected
in June 1990 took six months to formulate a comprehensive reform plan. When
it came into effect in January 1991, its key elements resembled the shock
approach of Poland's Balcerowicz Plan introduced exactly one year earlier.^ The
plan included liberalisation of 85 per cent of prices (95 per cent in June 1991),
inland convertibility combined with a 50 per cent upfront devaluation, complete
abolition of import quotas and the introduction of a temporary 10 per cent import
surcharge, as well as drastic cuts in budgetary expenditures, involving most
8 This implies that we treat Czechoslovakia as one country for most parts of our analysis.
However, the different experiences of Slovakia and the Czech Republic shall be adressed,
too. An overview of Polish reforms until mid-1992 can be found in Raiser (1992).
9 The policy making environment and the economic discussions preceding the January
reform are vividly narrated in Myant (1992).consumer subsidies, and tight monetary policy as part of a macroeconomic
stabilisation package (Borenzstein et al., 1992). Although conservative
macroeconomic management preceding the reforms made for lower disequilibria
both domestically and in the balance of payments
1
0 the government additionally
relied on two nominal anchors to prevent the initial price jump from ushering in
an inflationary spiral. The exchange rate was fixed against a basket of Western
currencies and an incomes policy designed as part of a collective agreement,
providing for a 12 per cent fall in real wages over 1991.
The Czechoslovak stabilisation programme must be judged an unmitigated
success. Consumer prices rose 40 per cent from January to March 1991, but after
that the inflation rate was down to less-than 1 per cent per month, translating into
a trend rate of 10- 12 per cent per annum. Inspite of some administrative price
corrections in January 1992 and the introduction of VAT in January 1993,
consumer price inflation has been kept down and should not exceed 15 per cent
even this year (PlanEcon, 1993). This stabilisation success contrasts markedly
with Poland, where an inertial inflationary floor has persisted into the third year
of reform.
Nonetheless, Czechoslovakia has not avoided a deep industrial recession at the
start of the transition. GDP fell by 16 per cent in 1991 and another 5-7 per cent
in 1992. For 1993 recovery is expected in the Czech Republic, although the
disruption of trade with Slovakia may cause GDP to remain flat for another year,
while Slovakia may slip even deeper into recession. Of particular interest is the
fact, that unlike in the rest of Central Europe, the output fall in the Czech
Republic has not been followed by large unemployment (see Section 3).
On the structural side, Czechoslovakia swiftly moved to small scale
privatisation, involving some 25 000 economic units, mainly in services and
commerce. Large scale privatisation was prepared in 1991 and was initiated in
the second half of 1992 under the "voucher" scheme (Heinrich, 1993). Each
citizen was given 1000 voucher points that were to be allocated in several
rounds of public auctions. Shares of a total of 1500 enterprises in the first round
(Dyba and Svejnar, 1992) could be bought directly or through a so-called
investment funds. Although administrative bottlenecks and political barriers
connected to the separation of the Czech and Slovak Republics have delayed the
10 Czechoslovakia was estimated to enter the transition with a much smaller monetary
overhang than, for instance, Poland, shortages were limited, and the country's foreign debt
stood at merely 15 percent of GDP in 1989 (Borenzstein et al. (1992).completion of the first phase of mass privatisation,
1
1 by the end of 1993, the
share of the private sector in industrial production could reach over 35 per cent.
This is a remarkable achievement, if one takes into account that 98 per cent of
industrial output emanated from firms in state ownership prior to 1990.
Czechoslovakia has also accomplished a number, of important institutional
reforms. In 1990 a two-tiered banking system was introduced (Buch and
Schmieding, 1992). Although the banks remained initially specialised and
inherited portfolios that were largely sectorily concentrated, the intention of
moving towards a universal banking system was clearly stated, with the in-
volvement of banks in the voucher privatisation scheme. For the 1993 fiscal year
capital adequacy ratios of 6.25 per cent have been declared for the old banks,
new entrants after 1991 have to comply with the international standard of an 8
per cent capital-asset ratio. Moreover, the government has founded the
Consolidation Bank, charged with converting bad debts of the banking sector
into low interest bearing government bonds. Additionally, from April 1992, the
central government was required to cover its deficits by open market operations,
rather than borrowing directly from the Central Bank. All this implies a
substantial deepening of the capital market, which could indeed be observed
(Buch, 1993). Finally, after being postponed in October 1992, a bankruptcy law
has come into effect on April 22nd 1993. It involves a three months grace period
for enterprises in financial difficulties and came after several months of efforts to
clear inter-enterprise arrears under the auspices of the National Property Fund.
The effectiveness of this institutional framework shall concern us in Section 4.
b) Hungary
In contrast to Czechoslovakia, by the late 1980s Hungary had had two decades
of experience with economic reforms. Since the introduction of the New
Economic Mechanism in 1968 Hungarian economic policy was geared towards
gradually expanding the role of market incentives in the allocation of resources.
Prior to 1990 this was attempted mainly through a set of institutional reforms,
involving inter alia the abolishment of compulsory output targets for SOEs,
profit incentives for managers and workers, decentralisation of decision making
to the enterprise level, and in 1987-88 banking and tax reform (Hiemenz et al.,
1992). Foreign trade was also gradually liberalised. By the mid 1980s, the share
of market transactions not subjected to price controls had reached 40 per cent, by
Bidding has been closed in December 1992, but shareholders and investment funds are in
posession of their assets only since June 1993.1990 this had been gradually expanded to 90 per cent of all products (Falk and
Funke, 1993).
Inspite of these measures, Hungarian economic performance failed to outpace
that of its much more conservative Northern neighbour. Hungarians may have
been aquainted much earlier with market mechanisms and the competitiveness
of Hungary's industry may have been tested against Western competitors to a
greater extent, but the pre-1990 governments continued to be prone to
discretionary paternalistic interventions, which preserved soft budget constraints
for enterprises, leading to a perverse incentive structure in the economy (Kornai,
1986; Kornai and Matits, 1987). Thus, GDP growth stagnated throughout the
1980s, averaging 1.8 per cent in 1982-88, while inflation gradually increased to
reach 29 per cent in 1990. Additionally, the attempt to placate a disgruntled
population and compensate for falling domestic savings led the Hungarian
government to double its foreign debt between 1985 and 1990, when its gross
value stood at 21.2 billion US $, corresponding to a 45.5 per cent debt service
ratio relative to exports (in convertible currencies) ratio, an extremely high
figure both by comparison to other centrally planned economies (CPEs) and
some of the highly indebted developing countries (DCs) (Oblath, 1993). The
failure of piecemeal reforms prepared the ground for the toppling of Kadar from
the Communist leadership in May 1988 and the beginning of economic
transformation (Csaba, 1992b).
The Hungarian transformation so far, in a way, has been as eclectic as its
reforms were earlier. Price liberalisation was continued at a somewhat
accelerated pace, import liberalisation gradually reached 90 per cent of product
categories, only 10 per cent remaining subject to licensing (Csaba, 1992b).
Inland convertibility was, however, partially reversed in 1989, and only in 1992
were exchange controls fully lifted (Falk and Funke, 1993). In the area of
macroeconomic policy, the monetary stance has been much less tight than in
Poland or Czechoslovakia, while budget deficits overshot the original targets
both in 1991 and 1992. As a result, inflation had risen to over 30 per cent in
1991. In 1992 inflation was reduced to 23 per cent.
Significant institutional changes were introduced with the banking reform in
1987 and a bankruptcy law in 1988. However banking regulations were
tightened only at the end of 1991 and the New Bankruptcy Law enacted with a
four year lag in January 1992. Privatisation policy has shifted emphasis several
times (Mihalyi, 1993). In 1990, the process of "spontaneous privatisation" by
SOE managers was halted and responsibility for the transfer of ownership rightswas located with the State Property Agency (SPA). The underlying aim was to
sell state assets to the highest bidder. The slowness of this process - until the end
of 1992 only 18 per cent of large scale SOEs were privatised through this
method (EBRD, 1993) - and fears about a dominance of foreign capital yet again
opened the door for some privatisation from below, involving management and
worker buy-outs (Heinrich, 1993).
Inspite of the less disruptive character of its transformation, the Hungarian
economy has not escaped the deep recession besieging Central and Eastern
Europe. GDP fell approximately 3.5 per cent in 1990, dropped by 12 per cent in
1991 and declined another 4-5 per cent in 1992 (EBRD, 1993). Unemployment
hit the 13 per cent mark in the first quarter of 1993, while industrial production
began a slow recovery from the third quarter of 1992. Nonetheless, pressing
difficulties in the financial sphere, that prevent interest rates to fall, and a
budgetary situation, that is close to getting out of control,
1
2 may mean that
Hungary has to brace itself for yet another year of decline (GKI, 1992).
c) Three Opposing Hypotheses
In a recent paper this author has pointed at four stylised facts characterising
transition economies (Raiser, 1992). These were persistent moderate inflation
after an initial price jump, unprecedented output falls, particularly in the
state-owned industrial sector, rising budget deficits during the course of
transition, and rising unemployment with a significant lag behind output falls
(Table 1). Seen in relation to this broad canvas the above overview poses two
puzzles. First, while the cumulative output decline has been similar (close to 20
per cent) in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, in the latter inflation rates
have not exceeded 15 per cent per annum, if one excludes the initial price shock,
it has maintained fiscal balance, and unemployment rates have actually declined
in the second year of transition (Burda, 1993). Why and/or how has
Czechoslovakia, or at least the Czech Republic, avoided three of the four
stylised facts mentioned in this paragraph? Second, why has Hungary's early
start with gradual liberalisation and the establishment of some crucial market
institutions three years before Czechoslovakia not lessened the costs of transition
in the former country (see Koves, 1992). While a lot has been made recently of
the Hungarian "gradualist success story" (Hare and Revesz, 1992; Szekely and
Newberry, 1993) this seems hard to square with the evidence presented here.
1
2 The deficit reached 8 per cent of GDP in 1992 and could well reach the 10 per cent mark,
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Source: EBRD (1993), Statisticke Prehledy (1993).We suggest three opposing hypotheses that may account for these two puzzles.
First, differences in economic performance in transition economies may be due
to varying initial conditions. These would include exogenous factors such as
geographical location, historical traditions and other "natural endowments", but
also macroeconomic conditions at the start of transition, the extent of previous
liberalisation and commercialisation of economic exchange, and structural
differences related to the division of labour within the CMEA. Specifically,
unemployment may be smaller, where a safety valve for redundant labour exists
in a neighbouring country, where the inflow of tourism helps the rapid
development of a service economy, and where the structural distortions prior to
transition were less. Price stability could be due to a previous track-record of
prudent macroeconomic management that helps to reduce inflationary
expectations and avoids the problem of price inertia (Dornbusch and Fischer,
1991).
Second, it may be argued that relatively low unemployment rates in the Czech
Republic are an indication that the worst is still to come for the Czech economy
(Kopint Datorg, 1993; The Economist, 1993).^ Supporters of this view impute a
sense of inevitability to the recessions in all transition economies, including the
vicious circle of rising unemployment, a deteriorating fiscal situation, due to
increasing social welfare outlays, increasing inflation, and the slow emergence
of private sector jobs. Once the Czech and Slovak Republics have enacted
bankruptcy legislation and once privatisation has been completed, it is argued,
SOEs will be forced to reduce hidden unemployment. Implicitly, this view
would also expect to find evidence for soft budget constraints for SOEs in
Czechoslovakia that enabled them to hold on to their workforce either by
consuming their assets or running up debts with the expectation of a future
bail-out. Hence, low and constant inflation rates may hide loose financial
discipline and an underlying instability in the economy.
1
4
Third, differences in government policy and in the general approach to economic
reforms may determine the costs of adjustment to market conditions to a
significant degree (Raiser, 1993a). This view relates low unemployment rates in
the Czech Republic to specific policy measures that have helped to keep real
13 in Slovakia unemployment is already close to the Hungarian or Polish level. This
hypothesis would presumably see a much worse fate still in keeping for the Slovak
economy.
1
4 Such an argument is made by Raiser (1992) for Polish industry in 1990-91. We shall
compare developments in Poland and Czechoslovakia in the following section.10
wages down and favoured the creation of new jobs. Price stability is similarly
attributed to a monetary policy targeted at hardening budget constraints for
SOEs and direct credit controls that have helped to overcome financial legacies
and substituted efficiently for a market-based incentive structure. Hence, this
hypothesis lays particular stress on the behavioural changes within the state-
owned industrial sector. Only if SOEs react to changes in relative prices can
structural change take place at all. Moreover, this hypothesis calls attention to
the credibility and internal consistency of the newly created institutional
incentive structures, in order to account for diverging reform experiences.
In the following two sections these hypotheses shall be investigated. We start in
Section 3 by considering the exogenous factors that may account for the Czech
"miracle" of low inflation and low unemployment during its transition so far.
Then the case for a lack of enterprise adjustment in Czechoslovakia is taken up
and rejected by looking at the development of real wages and labour
productivity in particular in contrast to Poland and Hungary. The role of
government policy thus emerges as the most important element of relatively
successful reforms in Czechoslovakia. This finding is strengthened by
contrasting the incentive structures in Hungary's financial market reforms to
those in Czechoslovakia in Section 4.
III. A Tentative Explanation of the Czech Miracle
a) Exogenous Factors and Initial Conditions
Czechoslovakia entered the transition with the lowest foreign debt of the three
Vishegrad countries. This reduced the need to finance interest payments by
running trade surpluses. On the other hand, Hungary's initially precarious level
of foreign reserves did not allow for the use of the exchange rate as a nominal
anchor in price stabilisation (Fry and Nuti, 1992). In fact, however, the
Hungarian real effective exchange rate substantially appreciated over the period
of 1990-92, bringing the Forint quite close to its purchasing power parity level
(PlanEcon, 1993). The large inflow of direct foreign investment and a surge in
convertible currency exports have prevented balance of payments difficulties,
related to the inherited foreign debt. The rise in Hungarian inflation up to 1991
cannot thus be attributed to its lack of a nominal exchange rate anchor.
The small monetary overhang in Czechoslovakia is often quoted as a factor that
portended a less drastic stabilisation effort in Czechoslovakia at the start of
transition (Borenzstein et al., 1992). While this may be true, it did in fact not
lead to a less restrictive monetary policy to stem the inflationary pressuresresulting from price liberalisation (see Section 4). Hungary similarly had no
monetary overhang by the late 1980s, mainly due to the gradual liberalisation of
40 per cent of prices that it had achieved as early as 1987. However, the country
opted for a less disruptive monetary policy. Hence, rather than declining as in
Czechoslovakia, Hungary's inflation rates since the start of transition were rising
until 1991. The same result obtains for a comparison of fiscal policies in both
countries. Both entered the transition with balanced budgets. Hungary
introduced important fiscal reforms, such as the replacement of turnover taxation
with VAT, as early as 1988, but its fiscal deficits have been constantly on the
increase since 1990. Hence price stability continues to be endangered.
Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, has been true to its tradition of fiscal
balance. In conclusion, the initial macroeconomic conditions in Czechoslovakia
and Hungary were not that unfavourable to the latter country. If Hungary still
battles with inflationary tendencies, then this must be related to its
macroeconomic policy design above all.
Let us now turn to the issue of unemployment and go through the exogenous
factors that may have limited unemployment in the Czech Republic both in
contrast to Slovakia and Hungary. First, one has to take into account the high
level of industrial development in Bohemia and Moravia even before world war
II. The Czech lands had a national income probably exceeding that of Austria in
1945 and measured in terms of purchasing power parities the Czech Republic's
GDP surpassed that of Hungary by 23 per cent in 1992 (PlanEcon, 1993). Before
embarking on the Stalinist development path, stressing heavy concentrated
industrial compounds at the expense of small and medium scale enterprises, an
industrial structure existed in the Czech Republic that engrained entrepreneurial
expertise in the minds of its population (Audretsch, 1992; McDermott and
Mejstrik, 1992). Especially the rapid development of small scale businesses after
the initiation of privatisation may have been favoured by this tradition.
If this argument is taken to imply that a capitalist history may help to shorten the
transition back from socialism, then it should not be limited to the Czech
Republic. Indeed, Hungary's experience with private enteiprises and
"moonlighting" activities since 1968 should have provided a much better
training ground and storage facility for the knowledge of how to do business,
than a tradition reaching 40 years back!
Second, the inflow of tourism and large amounts of foreign investment capital
are prime reasons behind a strong private sector dynamic in the Czech Republic.
The private sector's share in GDP almost doubled from 10.6 per cent in 1991 to12
19.5 per cent in 1992 (PlanEcon, 1993). Prague's unique attraction to foreign
visitors continues to create a labour shortage, in the Czech capital. In 1992 the
Czech Republic boasted a 800 million US $ surplus in services (PlanEcon,
1993), mainly from tourism. Direct foreign investment by the second half of
1992 had reached a quarterly rate of 420 million US $. This stands in stark
contrast to the Slovak experience of rather lukewarm foreign interests and
certainly accounts for the larger number of vacancies in the Czech lands (Burda,
1993). However, Hungary is still the most successful attractor of foreign
investments in the region. Neither this nor Budapest's reputable tourist
attractions have limited unemployment there.
1
5 This would again point to a
different adjustment pattern in the industrial sectors of Czechoslovakia and
Hungary as a prime reason for diverging unemployment rates.
Third, the Czech Republic's geographical location on the border to Germany
may have provided easy access to Western markets and a safety valve for
redundant workers, that have crossed into Saxonia and Bavaria by the thousands.
Unfortunately, we could not find any data that would indicate the importance of
the latter phenomenon.
1
6 Hence, the following argument follows merely by
conjecture. The contribution of cross-border migration to low unemployment in
the Czech Republic is supported by evidence from Slovakia and Hungary,
pointing at wide regional differences in unemployment. Indeed, close to the
Austrian border unemployment in Hungary was below 10 per cent and similarly
the area around Bratislawa in the Slovak Republic has maintained relatively low
unemployment rates (Burda, 1993; PlanEcon, 1993).
1
7 As Burda (1993) shows
the vacancy-unemployment ratio displayed a large variance in the Czech
republic, too. However, it was still higher in Northern Moravia than in
Bratislawa, inspite of a significantly longer geographical distance to the border
with Western Europe. This fact is congruent with the finding of PlanEcon (1993)
that unemployment pockets of 20-25 per cent are singularly absent in the Czech
Republic. Unless we assume a much larger propensity to migrate among the
Czech population, geographical proximity alone cannot explain such large
unemployment differences as we observe. The same holds true for access to
1
5 Hungary's surplus in tourism was 590 million US $ in 1992 (NBH, 1992).
'6 Inofficial estimates given to the author by the Ministry of Finance are in the range of
20 000 regular pendlers. This is less than 1% of the active labour force.
1
7 Interestingly, Polish unemployment was highest in the Lower Silesia region bordering East
Germany (PlanEcon, 1993). It is possible that high unemployment in East Germany
provided less opportunities for cross-migration, or that Polish labour market policies made
it easier to work illegaly abroad and be registered as unemployed at home.1
3 BibSiothel
4e$ Instifuts fur Weifv/ii
Western markets. The aggregate trade data^does not indicate that Czech exports
to Western Europe have grown considerably faster than Hungary's. According to
PlanEcon (1993) Hungary's exports on a customs basis rose by 10.5 per cent in
1992, equivalent to roughly 2 per cent in real terms. Czech exports in 1992
declined overall by 1.8 per cent, although this possibly reflects some speculation
about a devaluation of the Czech crown towards the end of 1992. Germany's
share of total Hungarian exports was 25.5 per cent in 1991, while it took
roughly 22 per cent of Czech shipments in 1992 (PlanEcon, 1993). Even if
Eastern Hungary and Slovakia have been geographically disadvantaged, if we
take Czechoslovakia as a whole, unemployment was still only half the
Hungarian level in 1992. This strongly suggests that policy differences at a
national level were the main factor influencing economic performance during
transition so far.
As a final argument supporting the first hypothesis, we turn to structural
differences that could explain a higher level of transitionary unemployment in
those areas burdened with the most inefficient industrial "dinosaurs" (Siebert,
199l).It is unfortunately extremely difficult to make any informed guesses about
the extent of structural distortions in any of the CPEs prior to the start of
transition. In the most comprehensive attempt to date Hare and Hughes (1992)
find that the share of output in industries with negative value added at world
prices, calculated using the domestic resource cost methodology, was 34.8 per
cent in Czechoslovakia and 34.6 per cent in Hungary.
18 This does not give any
a priori indication of higher structural distortions in either of the two countries.
What other indicators could one use?
One crucial aspect of industrial inefficiency in CPEs economies was the level of
energy intensity in production. With the rise in the price of Russian oil exports
to world market levels, after the collapse of the CMEA, the heavy industrial
sector should have been particularly affected. As Borenzstein et al. (1992) note,
in Czechoslovakia this sector counts for a relatively large proportion of
industrial output. Moreover, Slovakia as the arms forgery of the Warsaw Pact
was probably most severely hit by the decline in demand for military equipment.
In trying to make sense of differences in unemployment in the Czech and Slovak
Republics several observers have alluded to this structural disadvantage of the
latter country (Borenzstein et al., 1992; The Economist, 1993; PlanEcon, 1993).
1° These figures include adjustments for output quality and are based on input-output data
from 1986 and 1987, and on 1988 and 1989 prices for Hungary and Czechoslovakia
respectively.14
A different way to look at the same problem is to compare Hungary's and
Czechoslovakia's trade dependence on the CMEA. Interestingly, Hungary
managed to reduce the share of exports going to the Soviet market alone from 35
per cent in 1985 to 18.7 per cent in 1990 (Csaba, 1993). In the same year as
much as 40 per cent of Czechoslovakia's exports were still destined to the Soviet
Union (Griffith-Jones, 1992). Thus, it would seem that, if anything, structural
factors should have made for more unemployment in the Czech and Slovak
Republics than in Hungary.
The relevance of structural factors in determining unemployment differences is
further weakened, if one takes into account that the decline in industrial output
and employment was virtually the same in the Czech and Slovak Republics both
in 1991 and in 1992. We conclude at this stage that Hungary's position in terms
of industrial structure, access to foreign capital, geographical proximity to
Western labour markets, and macroeconomic conditions was not substantially
worse than that of Czechoslovakia. Unemployment differences between the
Czech and Slovak Republics may have to do with exogenous factors in so far as
foreign capital inflows helped the creation of new jobs and Slovaks were
disadvantaged in their access to cross-border employment opportunities.
b) Is the Worst Still to Come?
In an analysis of enterprise behaviour in 1990 and 1991 Krovak et al. (1992)
strongly support the hypothesis of limited behavioural adjustment in
Czechoslovak industry. Their findings are based on six aggregate indicators of
enterprise behaviour, including revenues, profit rates, unemployment, enterprise
indebtedness, bank credits to the enterprise sector, and enterprise deposits. The
case for delayed behavioural adjustment rests on one particular observation,
namely the close positive correlation of enterprise deposits and enterprise
indebtedness. For Krovak et al. (1992) SOE managers used short term credits
from the state banking sector for the purpose of decapitalising their firms prior to
privatisation. The obtained funds were presumably transfered onto bank
accounts under another name, while raising the debt/asset ratio of the firm would
lower its market value. ^ This contention is further supported by the evidence of
a lag of unemployment behind the fall in revenues and profits, and a negative
correlation between profits and deposits.
19 Krovak et al. fail to provide any disaggregated data by firm. Hence, it is quite possible that
the increase in deposits comes from those firms that are profitable, while indebtedness,
including involuntary trade credits builds up in the inefficient enterprises.15
The analysis of Krovak et al. seems to provide a reason for the phenomenon of a
lack of structural change in 1991 identified by Borenzstein et al. (1992) and
Hare and Hughes (1992), stemming from end-game strategies by SOE managers
(see also Schmieding, 1991; 1993b). If Krovak et al. are right, the pattern of
industrial adjustment in Czechoslovakia reflects the prevalence of soft budget
constraints and perverse incentives in the industrial sector. This is precisely what
this author has argued with respect to Poland (Raiser, 1992). A comparison of
enterprise behaviour may thus help to decide the matter.
Indeed, macroeconomic developments in Czechoslovakia over 1991 mirror quite
closely developments in Poland after the initiation of the Balcerowicz
programme exactly one year earlier. While the budget recorded an initial surplus
of 10 per cent of GDP in the first half of the year (8 per cent in Poland, see
Raiser, 1992), the overall deficit at the end of the year had reached 2 per cent of
GDP (Borenzstein et al., 1992). Unemployment in Poland at the end of 1990 was
6 per cent, while it was 6.6 per cent in Czechoslovakia in December 1991.
Moreover, in Hungary unemployment was only 8 per cent by the end of 1991
and the fiscal deficit limited to 3.2 per cent of GDP. Both figures rose
dramatically in 1992, when bankruptcy legislation may have increased pressures
for structural adjustment. All indication was that further profitability declines, a
deepening recession, rapidly rising unemployment, and an emerging fiscal crisis
would haunt Czechoslovakia, too, in 1992. But the ghost has not appeared.
In the following we concentrate on one particular indicator of enterprise
behaviour namely the relationship of real wages to labour productivity to explain
this aspect of the Czech "miracle". As Estrin, Schaffer and Singh (1992) argue
this may indicate whether cost minimisation was followed by SOEs. Other
indicators, such as profitability figures, are less reliable and in any case
unavailable for Czechoslovakia. Our approach has the additional benefit that the
surprising explosion of real wages in Poland has often been cited as one crucial
indication of loose financial discipline in the enterprise sector (Pinto et al., 1992;
Raiser, 1992). The results obtained here hence also prepare the ground for the
discussion in Section 4.
An analysis of the available data (for sources see Graphs 1, 2, 3) leads to the
following observations:
1) On a sectoral level a correlation of a nominal wage index with labour
productivity for 17 branches of Czechoslovak industry yielded a significant
positive coefficient. This confirms results of a firm-based survey conducted by16
Estrin, Gelb and Singh (1993), who found a substantial adjustment process under
way in Czechoslovak industrial firms over 1992.
2) The fall in industrial production in Czechoslovakia was halted in the second
half of 1992 (PlanEcon, 1993). This compares to a constant pace of labour
shedding of around 10-12 per cent per annum, so that the industrial sector was
able to maintain labour productivity during the first half of 1992 and even
substantially increase it in the last quarter of that year (Graph 1). This recovery
in labour productivity could signify an important turn-around for the still
predominantly state-owned industrial sector, reducing the period of transitionary
recession in Czechoslovakia to less than two years. The contrast is provided by
Poland where employment fell at a roughly similar pace following the start of
transition in 1990, but a second collapse in output aLthe beginning of 1991
meant that labour productivity was still declining until the end of the second year
of transition (Graph 2).
3) There was an acceleration of nominal wage increases in Czechoslovakia
during 1992. Deflated by the CPI real wages have risen by around 7 per cent.
However at the end of 1991 real wages were 26 per cent below their average
level in 1990. By contrast, in Poland real consumer wages fell rather less during
the first half of 1990 (i.e. the first year of transition) and had regained 90 per
cent of their 1989 level by year end. When real product wages are considered the
contrast is even more striking. As producer prices rose much less in Poland than
consumer prices (see also Estrin, Schaffer and Singh, 1992), the real product
wage actually rose above its 1989 average by December 1990.20 Polish
enterprises not only gave in to workers' wage demands more easily but they also
suffered from the fact that even a limited decline in consumers' standard of
living would correspond to a massive rise in unit labour costs.
4) The most striking difference between Czechoslovakia and Poland, however,
results from combining the observations about labour productivity and real
product wages. While in Czechoslovakia there is an almost perfect correlation
for the industrial sector as a whole, real product wages in Poland exhibit a
temporary peak at the turn of each year. More seriously, the real product wage
20 The phenomenon of the rising "wedge" between producer and consumer prices may have a
number of explanations. It is driven by the larger share of non-tradeables, notable services,
in the CPI. Hence exchange rate overvaluation in Poland, and to some degree in Hungary
is one candidate. Relative to its PPP level the Czech Koruna by contrast is still strongly
undervalued (PlanEcon, 1993).17
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Sources: RWI: Real Average Wage Index, Czech Industry (PlanEcon, 1993); LPI: Labour
productivity Index (International Financial Statistics, 1993; PlanEcon, 1993), UCR, Czech
unemployment rate (PlanEcon, 1993); UCSFR: Czechoslovakian unemployment rate (Statisticke
Prehledy, 1993).








90:1 90:2 90:3 90:4 91:1 91:2 91:3 91:4 92:1 92:2 92:3 92:4
Sources: LPI: Labour productivity Index in Industry (PlanEcon, 1993), RWI: Real Average Wage
Index (PlanEcon, 1993), U, unemployment (PlanEcon, 1993).18
line stays above the labour productivity line from the second quarter of 1990
onwards. In Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, real product wages have stayed
below labour productivity throughout the transition. As the strong recovery of
labour productivity after September 1992 suggests, recent wage rises are
unlikely to fundamentally change this pattern.




























Sources: RCWI, RPWI: Average monthly nominal industrial wage (PlanEcon, 1993; Statztikai havi
kozlcmcnyck, 1991), deflated by CPI, PPI (International Financial Statistics, 1993); LPI: Labour
productivity index (PlanEcon, 1993; Statztikai havi kozlcmenyek, 1991); U: Unemployment, (Kopint-
Datorg, 1992, PlanEcon, 1993).
5) When Czechoslovakia and Poland are compared to Hungary, we first of all
note a much smaller decline in labour productivity in the latter case. This
corresponds to a much greater reduction in industrial employment, by 10 per
cent in 1990 and 18 per cent in 1991. Thus, Hungarian enterprises surprisingly
did not exhibit a similar reluctance to shed labour, as their Polish and
Czechoslovak counterparts. However, this adjustment in employment was
unfortunately not translated into stronger wage moderation. Real consumer
wages have fluctuated between 85 and 100 per cent of the 1989 average, while
the growing "wedge" between producer and consumer prices has meant that unit
labour costs were substantially higher in 1992 than three year earlier.
How can these four observations be combined into a consistent picture and does
it support or contradict the hypothesis of a lack of structural change in
Czechoslovakia as the root cause for lower unemployment? First, we can state19
that the level of unemployment seems to be related to the development of unit
labour costs in transition and not so much to structural adjustment per se. The
contrast between Hungary and Czechoslovakia is most illuminative in this
respect. While in both countries the industrial sector seems to have undergone
important adjustments (see also Estrin, Gelb and Singh, 1993), in Hungary this
was done primarily by laying people off, while Czechoslovak firms coped with
overmanning by reducing real wages in addition to increasing redundancies.
This casts substantial doubt on the pessimism of some authors concerning the
flexibility of factor prices during transition. However, if factor prices are flexible
and price elasticities of factor demand high, as in the Czechoslovak case, there is
no reason why structural adjustment needs to be costly. With real wages in
particular displaying little rigidity in the Czechoslovak case, the inevitability of
unemployment, once bankruptcy regulations are enforced, may similarly be
doubted. Hence our analysis raises the question by what policy measures the
Czechoslovak government may have encouraged real wage flexibility and
thereby limited unemployment (see next subsection).
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Second, given the roughly similar pace of labour shedding in industry in Poland
and Czechoslovakia higher unemployment in the former case seems to indicate
that obtaining a new job after having been made redundant was substantially
more difficult. This again points in the direction of active labour market policies
as a way to limit unemployment. Somewhat puzzling in this respect is the
well-established belief that recovery in Poland is firmly private sector based (e.g.
The Economist, 23.01.1993). This should have increased the pace of job
creation. We can only give two speculative answers that may be related to
statistical differences in the two countries. First, as Burda (1993) notes, a certain
degree of moonlighting is permitted in Poland, hence, the increase in private
sector employment to over 50 per cent of the Polish labour force should include
some "working unemployed", too. Second, many private activities in transition
economies continue to go unrecorded. While there is no a priori reason to expect
this phenomenon to be more important in Czechoslovakia, the relatively strict
labour market policies, there, may increase the supply of labour to the shadow
economy. A lower reservation wage could imply that private activities grow
even faster than statistically observed and that the Czech recovery may rival that
of Poland.
Of course, ultimately the costs of structural adjustment should be measured by GDP
declines. In this respect Hungary seems to have fared very slightly better than even the
Czech Republic. However, the substantial statistical uncertainty surrounding GDP figures
leaves open the possibility that this ranking could easily be reversed.20
Third, the development of unit labour costs would seem to have an influence on
the length of recession during the transition, too. This is supported by the fact
that industrial recovery in Poland and to a lesser degree in Hungary gained
momentum only during 1992. Czechoslovakia entered the transition process
later, but emerged from recession at the same time. The possibility that a
substantial part of the growth in the Czech service sector is underreported, raised
in our previous point, supports this conclusion.
The evidence presented so far leads us to reject the hypothesis of a lack of
behavioural adjustment in Czechoslovak industry at least as a cause for low
unemployment. We must now attempt to find support for the third hypothesis,
namely that government policies are one major reason behind lower
unemployment and inflation in Czechoslovakia. _The next subsection
consequently looks at labour market policies and relates those to the
development of real wages in Czechoslovakia.
c) Governing the Labour Market in Czechoslovakia
Labour market policies in Czechoslovakia have been characterised by a
considerable degree of direct interventions, inspite of the neo-liberal credo of the
Czechoslovak government and its successor in the Czech Republic.
With the letter of General Agreement signed by the government and the Czech
and Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions (CSKOS) on January 28th 1991 the
door was open to a substantial cut in real wages. In fact, the planned decrease of
12 per cent was almost doubled in the course of the year. Moreover, an initial
full indexation clause for minimum wages, set at 60 per cent of the average
January 1991 wage level, was unilaterally abolished by the government in June
1991. This raises the question of why trade unions did not stage more powerful
protests against this blatant and imposed reduction in workers' living standards.
One could think of four reasons. First, workers' preferences for job security in
the face of economic uncertainty may have overweighed wage aspirations. Low
unemployment was a goal they were willing to support with sacrifices. Second,
the CSKOS could not really be considered a political force of the "Solidarity"
caliber. It had only been founded in 1990, had no tradition of fighting for
workers' rights, and most of its officers were new to their jobs. This fostered an
atmosphere of almost unconditional support for the government's reform strategy
amongst the population. Third, the absence of multi-party coalitions in the
Czechoslovak government gave a degree of discretion and power to the
reformers in government, first and foremost the finance minister Vaclav Klaus,
that probably surpassed even that of Leszek Balcerowicz during the early stages21
of Poland's reform. Fourth, the government enhanced its credibility by pursuing
an active retraining and employment policy. More importantly, maybe, the
government strictly adhered to its balanced budget target (see below) and
thereby honoured its side of the commitment to price stability in the economy.
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The Czechoslovak government has adhered to its policy of wage controls until
the end of 1992. Excesses above the norm were taxed at a 500 per cent rate
(Myant, 1992). Unlike in Poland, where access to credit has allowed even
unprofitable firms to exceed the wage norms (Pinto et al., 1992),-3 excess wage
taxes have never become an important item in the federal budget (EBRD, 1993).
This, of course, is related to the extremely tight monetary stance followed in
Czechoslovakia since the beginning of reforms, which is the topic of the next
section. But the Czech government has recently reconfirmed that it does not shy
back from direct interventions in the labour market in addition to
macroeconomic policies. After the abolishment of wage taxes in January 1993
led to a rapid increase in real wages, penalties for nominal wage increases that
exceed revenues in the preceding quarter by 15 per cent have been reintrodueed
in July (CliU, 1993).
The second aspect of labour market policies in Czechoslovakia is the rather strict
eligibility criteria for unemployment benefit and the active retraining and
employment policy pursued by the Czech government in particular. In
comparing unemployment benefits across Central Europe, Burda (1993) finds
that only 38 per cent of all unemployed were covered by Czechoslovak
regulations, against 78 per cent in Hungary and 73 per cent in Poland.
Moonlighting is not permitted as in Poland, and new entrants into the labour
force arc strictly excluded. Multiplying the coverage ratio by the net present
valuevof the benefit package in terms of average weekly earnings, one gets an
index of the unaltractivencss of unemployment. Czechoslovakia scores best with
522 points, compared to 1240 for Poland and a startling 3388 in Hungary.
Clearly, Czechoslovakia intervened successfully to minimise friction in the
labour market, while Hungary's generosity probably contributed to the costly
adjustment path over rising unemployment. Finally, active employment
measures arc found by Burda (1993) to have contributed considerably to the
high vacancy-unemployment ratio in Czechoslovakia. Significantly, these
2
2 The importance of sticking to one's promises is stressed by Aspe (1992) in his assessment
of the Mexican "Pacto" as an important element of stabilisation success in that country.
2^ Raiser (1992) notes that delayed payment of excess wage taxes accounted for a large and
rising proportion of fiscal deficits in Poland over 1991-92.22
policies were initiated earlier in the Czech Republic than in Slovakia. Over 1991
157000 jobs were created by local authorities in the Czech lands against only
24000 in Slovakia. Figures published by the OECD employment: outlook
(OIICD, 1993) indicate that public measures to subsidise employment,
particularly in the private sector reached 2.3 per cent of the labour force. The
Czech Republic has invested 0.19 per cent of GDP in the mobilisation of labour
supply against 0.07 per cent and 0.15 per cent in Poland and Hungary
respectively. This again confirms our underlying argument that active labour
market policies are one prime reason behind lower unemployment in the Czech
Republic.
IV. FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICIES IN TRANSITION: The
Evolution of Financial Discipline in Czechoslovakia and Hungary
a) Enterprise Adjustment and Fiscal Consolidation
There are two sides to the problem of enterprise adjustment in economic
transition. If the enterprise sector fails to adjust to market conditions after the
start of full-blooded liberalisation this will necessarily entail either rising
unemployment and bankruptcies or a deepening financial and fiscal crisis related
to the prevalence of soft budget constraints that may temporarily shield the stale
owned industrial sector. If the contrast between Czechoslovakia, Poland and
Hungary is to be tenable we should observe diverging developments in their
financial sectors and budgetary performance, loo. For Poland the extent of its
financial mess has been sketched in Raiser (1992). This section looks at the
evidence for soft budget constraints in Czechoslovakia and Hungary and
addresses the interrelations between industrial adjustment and macroeconomic
policies. Thereby we also try to account for the remaining inflation differential
between the two countries.
Let us start with the interrelation between enterprise adjustment and fiscal
consolidation during transition. There are two issues to be considered. On the
one hand, net transfers from the budget may be one way in which SOEs can
avoid the necessary adjustment. If an enterprise is able to cover its loss by
claiming subsidies from the government, then it may be able to hold on to its
labour force, while paying higher wages at the same time. As Hardy (1992)
shows theoretically, the government has an incentive to provide such subsidies,
if the social costs of unemployment are considered to be too high. SOB
managers are thus involved in a double bargaining game with workers and the
government, in which the formers' strength may determine the amount of money23
to be gained from the latter.24 On the other hand, the adjustment path chosen by
industry has a fundamental impact on the fiscal situation, even if subsidies are
largely absent. Thus, in order to lower the social costs of unemployment the
government may feel compelled to introduce a social safety net, which could
weigh heavily on the expenditures side of the budget. At the same time, higher
wages in SOEs reduce their overall profitability and may thus lead to an erosion
of the traditional tax base in transition economies.






































































































































1 Includes the state and local budgets, and extra-budgetary funds, but does not include the funds of ministries and
subsidised organisations. Data for 1988 are not strictly comparable with those of later years. - ^ Data for 1992 arc










years. - •* I Docs not include net disbursements for
in this presentation. -
 4 Includes subsidies through
budget definitions, which not necessarily consistent with the
definitions used in the general government accounts.
Source: EBRD (1993).
24 Germany's current policy in the East comes close to this scenario, where unsustainable
initial wage increases have caused employment to fall by over 50 per cent, and social
unrest, including hunger strikes by workers, pushes the government to maintain
employment by susbsidies in those firms it has so far been unable to sell.24
These two interrelated issues can be vividly illustrated by a comparison of
Czechoslovakia and Hungary. As Tables 2 and 3 show both countries have
substantially reduced subsidies to the enterprise sector; Czechoslovakia from a
startling 20 per cent of GDP in 1989 to only 5.1 per cent in 1992, Hungary from
8.1 per cent in 1988 to an estimated 2.7 per cent in 1992. Governments in both
countries have been firm in their determination to stop the support of SOEs out
of the general government accounts.
2
5 The reduction of enterprise profit and
turnover taxes on the revenue side is similarly accentuated in Czechoslovakia
and Hungary. The sum of both items reached 31.5 per cent of GDP in 1988 in
the former and 30.2 per cent in the latter. By 1992, this figure had fallen to 23.8
per cent in Czechoslovakia and a mere 17.2 per cent in Hungary. Overall, early
tax reforms in Hungary seem to have enabled the government to maintain its
revenue share in GDP around 52-54 per cent.
2
6 Czechoslovakia suffered a
decline by 8.5 percentage points between 1988 and 1992. One would have
expected that this would pose a severe burden on Czechoslovak fiscal policies.
However, the budget remained roughly balanced.
2
7 In Hungary, by contrast the
fiscal deficit exploded in 1992. The major reason, is the dramatic rise in the
social security budget (see also Kornai 1992b), leading to an overall increase in
the state expenditure quota in GDP to over 60 per cent. Rising unemployment is
thus one of the main reasons behind fiscal problems in Hungary. Inspite of
institutional reforms on the fiscal side, inconsistent government policies have
increased budgetary problems. In Czechoslovakia low unemployment meant less
need for a generous social security system. Moreover, the recent introduction of
VAT in January 1993 has posed no threat at all to fiscal stability (CBU, 1993).
Stringent expenditure management remains the key to fiscal consolidation, and a
necessary condition for successful institutional reforms.
The alternative to direct transfers from the budget for loss making enterprises,
was to rely on subsidies from the financial system. This is all the more relevant
2
5 This, of course, still leaves open the possibility of subsidies through the financial system to
which we turn further below.
2
6 Perversely, this has been done by increasing the reliance on payroll taxes, hence making
wage labour an extremely unattractive form of employment (EBRD, 1993). This may have
further increased the redundancies and pushed employees into illegal or case by case
contract work, while also increasing the number of claimants on unemployment insurance.
See below.
2
7 The 3.3 per cent deficit in relation to GDP given in Table 2 as an estimate for 1992 is
probably much too high. Indeed, both PlanEcon (1993) and CBU (1993) report a balanced
budget for the year.25
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Source: EBRD (1993).
to the issue of SOE adjustment, as capital markets in transition economies are
generally underdeveloped and the banking system typically has remained in
majority state ownership for some time. Two problems are particularly pertinent
to this issue. First, there is a debate whether monetary policies in transition
economies have been too tight and thereby have exacerbated output falls (Calvo
and Coricelli, 1992), or whether expansionary monetary policies merely fuel
additional wage increases and ultimately leave the real economy unaffected,
while raising inflation rates (Hrncir, 1992; Raiser, 1992; Schmieding, 1993b).
Second, even tight monetary policies may be ineffective in limiting the access of
SOEs to liquidity, as deficient capital markets allow for the expansion of
monetary substitutes in the form of payment default and the spread of loose
financial discipline (Bofinger, 1992; Raiser, 1992; Komai, 1993). Differing
monetary policies and diverging approaches to capital market reform are thus the
other two areas where we contrast the Czechoslovak to the Hungarian
experience, in order to find support for our contention that Czechoslovakia
successfully avoided large scale unemployment and high inflation during
transformation due to credible and well targeted government interventions.26
b) The Role of Credit
As mentioned in Section 3, neither Czechoslovakia nor Hungary entered the
transition with a substantial disequilibirum in the money market, which was
pervasive in most CPEs in the form of the "monetary overhang". Monetary
policy immediately after price liberalisation could thus be conducted without the
danger of a sudden spending spree following the decumulation of forced
savings.
Arguably more important than monetary aggregates is the distribution of credit
among the various sectors of the economy. Under central planning, credit to the
enterprise sector responded passively to the need for liquidity, while the
household money circuit was entirely disconnected from enterprise finance.
Monetary policy during transition thus had to be aware- of the legacy of close
contacts between bank managers and the directors of SOEs, that might
perpetuate the allocation of capital on demand, with no consideration of
expected returns (Raiser, 1993a). Thus in addition to tightening the provision of
credit to the economy overall, in order to stem inflationary pressures,
institutional reforms to improve the efficiency of capital allocation were
paramount to a successful transition on the monetary side.





































































































































































Source: Own calculations based on: SBCZ (1992).27
As Table 4 reveals monetary policy in Czechoslovakia has been extremely tight
in 1991, while it was slightly expansionary in 1992. The contraction in 1991 was
considerably greater than anticipated, as the projected yearly inflation of 30 per
cent was exceeded by over 20 percentage points. Real Ml fell by roughly 25 per
cent in 1991, reflecting both a fall in currency in circulation and in demand
deposits. Time and savings deposits also fell dramatically, indicating a decline in
savings, which is explained by the substantial deterioration of money incomes of
the population. Interestingly, however, total liabilities of the banking sector to
enterprises increased. This would seem congruent with the contention by Krovak
et al. (1992) that the rise of SOE deposits reflects purposeful decapitalisation in
the light of increasing enterprise indebtedness. However, a look at Table 5
refutes that argument. In fact, total credit of the banking sector to SOEs rose by
merely 5.7 per cent over 1991 as a whole, a decline of almost 50 per cent in real
terms.
2
8 The rise in SOE demand deposits rather reflects their precaution in the
face of considerable economic uncertainty. It seems that SOEs in
Czechoslovakia almost overreacted to the limited access to bank credits by
breasting themselves for any unexpected further decline in their liquidity. This
lies behind the drastic fall in real wages during 1991 and reflects the fact that
monetary policies were credible and perceived to have shifted permanently. We
argue that this is the main reason for the remarkable price stability achieved
almost immediately after the initial price shock of January 1991, and maintained
ever since. The general caution in Czechoslovakia's monetary sector is finally
reflected in the unwillingness of banks to extend medium and long term credits.
The ratio of short term to medium plus long term assets in their portfolios rose
dramatically from 27.5 per cent in March 1990 to 48.2 per cent one year later
and 64.6 per cent by March 1992.
Inspite of a much looser monetary stance over 1992, SOEs continued to face
extremely tight liquidity conditions. Table 5 exposes the further decline in
credits to SOEs, by 13.2 per cent over the year in nominal terms. On the other
hand, the private sector benefited greatly from the real increase in total domestic
credit by 3 per cent. Its share in total assets of the banking sector rose from 5.7
per cent in December 1991 to 26.4 per cent at the end of 1992. Hence the share
of the private sector in total credit for the first time exceeded its share in
industrial production and GDP. With the goal of price stability achieved in 1991,
28 Of course, SOEs could still have avoided an adjustment to tighter liquidity by simply
defaulting on outstanding payments. We look at this possibility in the next subsection.28
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Source: Own calculations based on: SBCZ (1992).
the Czechoslovak authorities could allow themselves to loosen up the tight
monetary reign. But crucially, this did not lead to a resumption of perverse credit
allocation to inefficient SOEs as in Poland at the end of 1990. Parallely, the
banking sector could afford to increase the share of long term loans again, while
there was a remarkable shift in the deposit structure towards longer term
liabilities. It is important in this respect to note that SOEs in particular drew
heavily on their accumulated demand deposits to finance wage increases over
1992. Hence, unlike in Poland wage increases in SOEs did not follow on the29
heals of a rise in credits, but simply reflected an internal shift of enterprise
resources.
Monetary developments in Hungary over 1990-92 followed a decrease in real
money supply in both 1988 and 1989. Broad money fell by 12 per cent in 1988
and another 5 per cent in 1989 in real terms. During 1990-92 monetary policy
was moderately restrictive. Broad money rose almost in line with consumer
price inflation over 1990-91 and increased by 7 per cent in real terms in 1992
(Table 6).


































































































































































For reasons that we come back to below, the monetary contraction in 1988-89
did not initiate structural change in Hungarian industry (see also Estrin et al.,
1992). It was thus of interest to see, whether the change of government to a
democratically elected coalition in June 1990 would at least alter the allocation
of credit away from the support of ailing SOEs. Unfortunately the statistics for
Hungary do not distinguish between state owned and private firms. Table 6
nonetheless reveals that the real bank debt of the commercial sector, stayed
constant in 1990 and fell significantly in 1991, if one uses the consumer price
deflator. However, it still rose about as rapidly as producer prices in that year.
The latter figure measures the access to liquidity of the enterprise sector more30
accurately. Thus we do not detect any strong restriction of bank lending to
enterprises during 1990-91. We conjecture on the basis of the small absolute
importance of the private sector that the bulk of bank loans was used to keep
SOEs afloat in times of a severe profitability crisis. The remarkable behaviour of
real wages in Hungary would support this contention. Only with the introduction
of bankruptcy legislation in 1992 did the situation change. Real bank lending to
the corporate sector fell by roughly 20 per cent. This severe credit restriction is
expected to have greatly increased financial discipline.
2^
These observations raise two important issues, that shall serve to contrast
Hungarian monetary policy to that of Czechoslovakia.
First, the contraction of credit to enterprises was limited in Hungary until 1992.
In this sense, the country provides an empirical counterfactual to Calvo and
Coricelli's (1992) credit crunch explanation for the recession in transition
economies. Indeed, real credit in terms of producer prices fell by 28 per cent in
Czechoslovakia in 1991, while it stayed constant in Hungary. Industrial output at
the end of 1991 was 25 per cent below the 1990 figure in Czechoslovakia, while
the decline over 1991 was 18 per cent in Hungary. The initially less disruptive
character of Hungary's credit policies only slightly alleviated the industrial
recession, because much of the money went into financing the service of bad
debts. Much of the difference in monetary policies in Hungary and
Czechoslovakia over 1990-91 simply was due to good money chasing bad
money in the former case. In this situation the government was challenged to
provide appropriate incentives to prevent creditor passivity (see Begg and
Portes, 1992). Only Czechoslovakia took this challenge seriously.
Second, the situation in Hungary in 1992 is a textbook case of crowding out of
the commercial sector by rising government debt. Its large increase since the
second quarter of 1991 has provided an attractive outlet for funds that have
accumulated in the banking sector. Moreover, the government seemed the only
creditworthy entity left in Hungary, after the extent of the financial crisis had
become clear.
3
0 In Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, the increase in broad
29 Note however, that as Szanyi (1992) argues, the uncertainty, connected to the large
number of liquidations, similarly affects the access of profitable firms to bank loans. With
real lending rates falling much slower than real deposit rates, investment-led recovery may
yet be far away (see also Budapest Bank, 1993).
30 The banking sector's dependence on government paper on their asset side gives a perverse
twist to the government's monetary policy in the future. If it attempts to increase the
demand for money by lowering the yield on its treasury bills, thereby also reducing its own
debt service, this reduces revenues for the banks, which will therefore seek to recoup the31
money in 1992 was accompanied by renewed lending to the enterprise sector,
HptnAfjfin or r\Yi\mtf* firmc QK^/P 'ill benefiting private firms above all.
c) Governing the Capital Market in Transition
The discussion of general monetary developments in Czechoslovakia and
Hungary has left open the question of how a perverse allocation of credit was
largely avoided in Czechoslovakia and why problems persisted in Hungary,
despite its early start with institutional reforms in the capital market. We start
with the Hungarian case as it exposes the nature of the problem.
In 1987 a two-tiered banking system was introduced in Hungary. The state
monobank was split into three commercial banks that inherited portfolios,
divided roughly along sectoral lines (Abel and Bonin 1992). The National Bank
of Hungary was established as the central monetary authority with control over
interest rates and charged with the refinancing of the banking sector. Although
the banking reform allowed the establishment of new commercial banks, the
three largest banks, the Hungarian Credit Bank (HCB), the Commercial and
Credit Bank (CC), and the Budapest Bank (BB) still accounted for 87 per cent of
all enterprise deposits and 76 per cent of all assets in the commercial sector in
1990 (Abel and Bonin, 1992). Hence competition was virtually absent from the
beginning. Moreover, ownership of the three largest commercial banks was
distributed among the government and SOEs.
In this situation of pervasive cross ownership, the political pressures on the
banks both from the government and from enterprise managers were high. Until
1990 both were essentially concerned with avoiding any social costs of the
transition to a market economy and thus, in order to prevent bankruptcies, bank
lending to ailing enterprises continued. Non-performing assets in the banking
sector grew from 2.8 billion HUF in 1987 to 43.3 billion HUF in 1990, of which
roughly 90 per cent were due to the HCB, the CC, and the BB alone (Buch and
Schmieding, 1992; Szanyi, 1993).31
Against this increase in non-performing assets stood the legacy of an extremely
thin capital base. In 1987 70 per cent of commercial bank liabilities were due to
loss by raising interest rates on corporate loans. All this is closely related to the
undercapitalisation of the banking sector, and ultimately to the delay in the enforcement of
banking supervision. See also Budapest Bank (1993).
31 Note the parallel to Chile's experience with financial liberalisation, in which cross
ownership of the banking sector by the "grupos", large indsutrial conglomerates,
eventually led to the collapse of the banking system under the burden of non-performing
loans. See Raiser (1993b).32
the National Bank of Hungary on account of its refinancing facilities (Estrin et
al., 1992). At the end of 1990 46 billion HUF in paid up capital and reserves of
the banking sector stood against 43 billion HUF in bad debts. In sum the
legacies of the communist era in Hungary not only perpetuated political
interference in the allocation of credit, but they also created a banking system
that was fundamentally weak and undercapitalised. To redress this situation the
new government should have tightened banking supervision and improved
incentives to stop the lending to inefficient companies.
Unfortunately, none of this happened. Indeed, as long as the banks enjoyed an
unchallenged monopoly position, their weak capital base did not prevent them
from harvesting huge profits in their corporate lending activities. The central
bank refinancing rate was kept far below inflation in 1990 (Estrin et al., 1992),
allowing some build-up of bank capital on account of central bank credits.
However, capital asset adequacy ratios were only introduced in December 1991.
In fact, the government had a substantial share in the profits of the banking
sector, whose net transfers to the budget reached 7.6 per cent of total fiscal
receipts in 1990 (Abel and Bonin, 1992). This explains the reluctance to allow
banks to build up reserves from their pre tax income. The lack of incentives for
prudence in credit allocation was topped up by the possibility to charge
customers penalty interest on overdue payments. As the government lacked a
clear commitment to enforce bankruptcy on those economic entities in
repayment default, these would take up new loans to roll over old ones, in the
hope that a bail-out would be forthcoming in the future. The banks, sharing this
belief, were happy to extend a fresh loan as this increased their operating profits,
even if by sound accounting standards they should have written off the old
claims as a loss.
It is thus no surprise to find that bad debts in the banking sector rose to 252
billion HUF by September 1992, up by more than 500 per cent over the figure
two years earlier.^
2 By the time banking regulations were tightened in December
1991, the level of risk reserves of the three largest commercial banks was still
only 41 billion HUF (Szanyi, 1993). Compared to total bank credit to the
commercial sector, the official figures would put the share of non-performing
assets in September 1992 at roughly 30 per cent, taking the larger inofficial
estimates this rises to 40 per cent.
32 Inofficial estimates put the total of dubious claims in the banking sector at more than 300
billion HUF. .33
There is one final element of perverse capital allocation in transition economies
that is related to the problem of ineffective monetary policies. The counterpart to
non-performing assets in the banking sector are payment defaults between
enterprises, the so called involuntary trade credits or inter-enterprise credits. If
loans from the banking sector are unavailable, or lending rates on such loans are
too high, then enterprises may bridge a temporary liquidity crisis by delaying
payments to suppliers. This phenomenon is present in Western market
economies, too, but in transition economies, temporary liquidity crises have
turned to a protracted fall in enterprise revenues, and thus inter-enterprise arrears
have accumulated and involved increasing instances of open breach of contract
(Kornai, 1993). There is also a relation to the bad debt problem, as firms that are
not paid by their customers cannot in turn service their bank debts. Hence a
spiral of rising mutual indebtedness may develop, raising the spectre of a large
number of triggered bankruptcies.
A priori the extent to which inter-enterprise credits are a substitute to official
bank credit depends on the costs of contract violation. In principle it is also
possible that inter-enterprise credits rise simultaneously with total bank credit,
because firms do not expect any sanctions from misbehaviour. In fact, the access
to bank loans during 1990 and 1991 do not limit the spread of interenterprise
credits in Hungary (Table 7). Just as the neutral monetary policy could not limit
the fall in industrial output it did not prevent the massive rise in payment
defaults in the enterprise sector. Of course, it could still be claimed that this
would have supported an expansionary rather than neutral monetary policy.
However, during 1992, when credit tightness really began to bite, involuntary
trade credits were reduced by almost one half. At the same time the New
Bankruptcy Law was enacted in January 1992. This suggests that, indeed, the
rise in inter-enterprise credits has more to do with the enforcement of financial
discipline than with the stance of monetary policy.
Czechoslovakia started its capital market reforms much later than Hungary. Only
in 1990 was a two-tiered banking system introduced. The assets of the
monobank were distributed among two state owned banks, one for commercial
activities (Kommercny Banka, KB) and one for long term investment
(Investicny Banka, IB). The State Bank of Czechoslovakia was established as
central bank. Hence, the Czechoslovak banking sector inherited much the same
sectoral segmentation as its Hungarian counterpart. The banks were similarly
undercapitalised with a low 1.5 per cent capital asset ratio by early 1991 (Buch
and Schmieding, 1992). With the two major commercial banks in state
























































we include the 180 billion Kcs in Perpetual Inventory Credits (PCIs), extended
at a fixed interest rate of 6 per cent with no final maturity to finance
the working capital of SOEs in the 1970s, inherited non-performing assets were
probably at least as large in Czechoslovakia than in Hungary. How did the
Czechoslovak government deal with these legacies?
3
3
First, it kept refinancing rates low during the initial months of transition. Hence,
it used a similar avenue to Hungary in building up the initial capital base of the
banks. The State Bank's discount rate stayed at 5 per cent per annum until
November 1990 and thereafter rose to only 10 per cent for most of 1991. Real
lending rates were negative until June 1991.
Second, the government actively intervened in credit allocation by fixing credit
lines to SOEs for each commercial bank, while also imposing interest ceilings
on corporate loans. Thus it doubly reduced the incentive for banks to lend out to
SOEs. Indeed, the Czechoslovak credit crunch was not related to the cost of
credit but consciously administered by government decree. In fact, banks were
often more cautious in assessing an enterprise's creditworthiness as asked for by
the government. All new entrants into the banking system had to comply with an
3
3 In what follows we draw heavily on Buch and Schmieding (1992).35
8 per cent capital asset ratio, while the target for the old banks was fixed at 6.98
per cent for 1992. Crucially, risk reserves were tax deductible from the
beginning.
Third, the recapitalisation of banks was not left to their current operations alone.
Three months after the start of transition a Consolidation Bank was set up that
exchanged a total of 110 billion Ksc of PICs for fixed interest baring bonds with
an 8 year maturity. With the current inflation rate around 12 per cent the real
interest on these bonds is positive. Until mid-1992 the Consolidation Bank
managed to reduce the stock of PCIs to 95 billion Ksc by collecting repayments
from enterprises (Buch and Schmieding, 1992). Moreover, in October 1991 the
National Property Funds of the Czechoslovak federation, and the Czech and
Slovak Republics issued a total of 50 billion Ksc in government bonds. The aim
of these bonds is to selectively write-off non-performing loans to enterprises on
the conditions that they were taken out prior to 1989 and that the respective
firms were "potentially healthy". In December 22 billion Ksc of such loans were
cancelled.
It was as a result of these various interventions that the share of credit going to
SOEs was,greatly reduced (see also Section 4.b). The tight liquidity conditions
imposed on SOEs through credit ceilings forced them to reduce real wages
substantially, thereby contributing to lower unemployment. The rapidly growing
private sector at the same time was able to benefit from bank loans at low real
interest rates.
3
4 We now turn to the issue of payment defaults during economic
transformation in Czechoslovakia, to see whether the impact of monetary and
credit policies might nonetheless have been lessened by loose financial
discipline in Czechoslovakia, too.
The extent of non-performing assets in the Czechoslovak banks is hard to gauge.
Until the third quarter of 1992 dubious credits and loans temporarily in arrears
showed almost no increase, suggesting that the measures writing off old debts
and limiting the extension of new credits to enterprises were successful (Table
8). However, after an internal audit by foreign experts was conducted in a
number of Czech banks, the total of dubious claims alone increased to 10.4 per
cent of short term credits and 2.8 per cent and 8.2 per cent of medium and long
term credits respectively by the end of 1992. In the Czech Republic alone, the
Ministry of Finance estimates the sum of "risky" credits (dubious and
temporarily in arrears credits) to have reached 114.1 billion Ksc in October
34 Moreover, the early move on recapitalisation of the banking sector is a precondition for
maintaining low real interest rates in the future.36
1992, but falling to 100.8 billion Ksc by December. Against this. Czech banks
had accumulated 44.9 billion Ksc in reserves. It thus seems that the financial
sector was in distress in the Czech Republic inspite of the early move to
write-off a substantial share of the debt.
3
5



















































Source: Own calculations based on: SBCZ (1992).
There is, however, reason to believe that this will not affect the stability of the
Czech banking system in the future. First, according to the IMF representative in
Prague, only 15 billion of bad debts in the Czech banks arc non-performing
loans for domestic production. The rest are trade credits that arc fro/en on
transfer rouble clearing accounts and will be assumed by the Consolidation
Bank. This information is consistent with the claim by KB, the by far largest
holder of corporate debt, that it sold another 8 billion Ksc of bad loans to the
Consolidation Bank in 1992.
3
6
Second, the banks have played a major role in the first round of mass
privatisation in the Czech Republic.37 This gives them an interest in the solution
of the bad debt problem and the capacity to monitor enterprise performance
more effectively. If a bank continues to extend dubious loans to firms in which it
has equity, this will ultimately reduce the value of these assets. The important
thing to note is the connection between positive incentives for banks and strict
35 The situation in Slovakia is worse still, as its former heavy dependence on trade with the
CMEA has led to the accumulation of trade arrears in Slovak enterprises, which in turn
limits their repayment capability.
36The major difference to Hungary is, of course, that the'government is much less able to
grant debt write-offs, on account of its fiscal problems. Recent consolidation efforts in
Hungary are considered below.
3
7 Three of the largest four investment funds, bidding in the two consecutive rounds of
auctions, are run by commercial banks (PlanEcon, 1993). The Czech Savings Bank, the IB,
and KB together accounted for roughly 60 billion Ksc of the total 470 billion Ksc book
value of firms approved for privatisation.37
rules
 fset by the government. Thus, the sum of each bond issue is fixed in
advance, so that banks will attempt to select those companies for write-offs, that
have the largest potential.
3
8
Two further pieces of evidence should serve to strengthen our positive
assessment of capital market reforms in the Czech Republic in particular. As
mentioned above bad debts have started to decrease from October 1992
onwards. More interesting, still, is the behaviour of inter-enterprise credits. As
Table 9 shows, they more than doubled during 1991. SOEs took by far the
largest share with 149.6 billion Ksc of the total of 174.3 billion Ksc. Clearly, it
was possible even in Czechoslovakia to avoid credit ceilings and the extremely
tight monetary policy. At the end of 1991, the share of inter-enterprise credits to
total bank credit to enterprises was 25 per cent. However, if we add the increase
in inter-enterprise credits in Czechoslovakia to the change in the stock of total
credit to enterprises at the end of 1991, we still get an overall decrease in real
terms of almost 20 per cent. In Hungary the increase in inter-enterprise credits
over 1991 came on top of a roughly constant real enterprise debt to the banking
sector. As in Hungary, inter-enterprise credits in Czech SOEs declined with the
start of 1992, inspite of the continously tight liquidity conditions they were
facing. Although the Czech bankruptcy law was due to come into effect only in
October, and eventually was delayed for another six months, Czech enterprises
at least felt that there was a considerable cost associated with payment defaults.
The surprising fact is that this was achieved without recourse to drastic sanctions
as in Hungary in 1992. We contend that the underlying cause is to be found in
the consistency and credibility of Czechoslovak policy making.





































Source: Data provided by the Czech Ministry of Finance.
3% The liabilities of banks to voucher holders, whose confidence is crucial for the acquisition
of equity, strengthens this motivation. This should minimise moral hazard problems in the
process.38
The second piece of evidence comes from a comparison of interest spreads in
Czechoslovakia and Hungary over 1992. Table 10 shows that the margins
between nominal lending and deposit rates in Czechoslovakia have stayed
constant over 1992, while they have dramatically increased in Hungary. This
reflects the confidence of Czechoslovak banks that their capital asset ratios are
adequate and that they can meet the standards laid down by the government.
According to Budapest Bank (1993), by contrast, only very few Hungarian
banks will be able to comply with banking regulations, which explains why they
have become extremely cautious lenders. Thus, while Hungary's corporate sector
continues to be starved of funds that it badly needs to increase investments,
because banks are still licking the wounds of the past,
their Czech competitors have enjoyed falling lending rates in recent months. The
Czech State Bank has done its share by reducing the discount rate from 9.5 per
cent to 8 per cent and decreasing mandatory reserve requirements for
commercial banks in June 1993 (CBU, 1993). In sum, the above has exposed the
inconsistency of Hungary's early capital market reforms, while showing how
Czechoslovakia steered around a major financial crisis. The inadequacy of
Hungary's supervisory framework was recognised in 1992 and bankruptcy
legislation, new accounting standards and, in the second half of the year, a loan
consolidation programme were finally introduced. With these measures,
Hungary has been able to enforce financial discipline more effectively, which
has been reflected in declining inflation rates, inspite of a roughly constant pace
of broad money growth. However, as we attempt to show in the final subsection,
Hungary's recent reforms still fail to create incentives conducive to an efficiency
oriented financial restructuring process, actively monitored by the banks.
Instead, the pendulum would seem to have swung too far, involving enterprises
in liquidation procedures that may have been profitable with some injection of
new capital.39











































































































































































































































d) Sanctions but no Incentives: Hungary's Capital Market in 1992
The following two provisions contained in the Act on Accounting and the new
Bankruptcy Law introduced in December 1991 and January 1992 respectively
have fundamentally changed economic incentives in the financial sector:
- all businesses are entitled to create reserves against any doubtful claims from
pretax profits;
- any enterprise that defaults on outstanding payments for more than 90 days is
obliged to file for bankruptcy, and any creditor may initiate liquidation
proceedings, if a debtor is in default on a payment for more than 60 days (or
30 days after the receipt of a call for payment).
The first provision has finally created the conditions forthe recapitalisation of
banks out of current operations. From 1992 banks are required to maintain a
weighted capital asset ratio of 7.25 per cent for non-sovereign debt, rising to 8
per cent by 1993. Thereby, claims of "below average" quality carry a 20 per cent
reserve requirement, "doubtful" claims a 50 per cent reserve requirement, and
"bad" claims have to be provisioned for at full face value.39 As a result of this
change in banking regulations Hungarian commercial banks have become
extremely cautious lenders. We posit that this shift in banking behaviour can
only be explained by a change in their expectations about future government
policy. With the simultaneous enactment of the Bankruptcy Law the
determination of the government to no longer tolerate loss making in the
Hungarian economy was underlined. Nonetheless, as the evidence about rising
interest spreads presented in the previous subsection illustrates, the process of
recapitalisation of Hungarian banks is slow and, compared to Czechoslovakia
the prospects for a revival in corporate lending are rather bleak.
The second provision mentioned above had potentially even more far reaching
consequences for the Hungarian economy than the change in banking
regulations.. As Table 11 reveals the number of bankruptcy filings skyrocketed in
April 1992, 90 days after the new Bankruptcy Law had come into effect. The
2259 enterprises that filed for bankruptcy in that month alone can be regarded as
the overhang of insolvent firms in the Hungarian economy that had so far been
carried along by rescheduling arrangements, payment deferments etc.. The
™ Below average claims concern mainly loans to enterprise with a high sectoral risk,
doubtful claims include loans in interest or repayment default for more than 60 days, and
debts to enterprises with operating losses for two continous years in a row, and claims are
qualified as bad if the debtor is in default for more than 360 days or currently in
liquidation procedures.41
number of liquidation proceedings initiated against debtors in default similarly
rose dramatically to 2617 from January to March and 1281 in April 1992
(Kornai, 1993). Szanyi (1993) claims that by September 1992 a total of 10 per
cent of Hungarian enterprises were involved in either bankruptcy or liquidation
proceedings. These firms produced 26 per cent of GDP, employed 16 per cent of
the total labour force, and generated 37 per cent of export receipts. The
enforcement of bankruptcy regulations in Hungary has been accompanied by a
further decline in industrial production of 9.8 per cent and a rise of
unemployment to 12.3 per cent at the end of 1992. Closing loss-makers may
entail substantial costs, a warning that has not gone unheard in Czechoslovakia
and has influenced the latter's strategy in limiting the number of liquidations in
the process.









































As the fall in inter-enterprise arrears by 50 per cent during 1992 shows the
bankruptcy law was indeed effective in enforcing financial discipline in the
Hungarian enterprise sector. Nonetheless, its implementation uncovered a
number of serious defeciencies that may impair financial stability in the
Hungarian economy in the near future. First, the formulation of an obligatory
bankruptcy filing clause, the so-called "Harakiri"-clause, has pushed a number
of firms into bankruptcy procedures that actually were net creditors and had
developed sound financial strategies for the future (Szanyi, 1993). For them the42
law caused unnecessary trouble and may have deterred potential investors from
injecting their money, when it was most needed. The point here is that the sheer
numbers involved in bankruptcy procedures have exacerbated investment
uncertainty. This is not helped by the considerably administrative bottlenecks
that prevent the smooth conclusion of court cases.
Second, the role of the banks as potentially important monitors of enteiprise
performance has been neglected in the implementation of bankruptcy in
Hungary. In the list of creditors to be repaid in case of liquidation banks are last,
behind administrators, workers and the tax authorities. As total claims against an
enterprise not seldomly exceed its total assets, and banks have to make 100 per
cent provisions against debts of firms in liquidation, banks have no real
incentive to participate in the process. The possible leading role of banks in
financing a restructuring plan is thereby eschewed.40 Thus, while a firm may
easily be forced to enter liquidation procedures, its most important creditors,
namely the banks, lack the motivation to conclude the case. Enterprises continue
to produce in an effective state of limbo, while banks hope that their debtors
might be selected for write-off. Because unanimous consent is necessary to
agree upon a liquidation or restructuring plan, 60 per cent of 4231 bankruptcy
cases in 1992 have been postponed (Szanyi, 1993). The uncertainty created by
the Harakiri clause is thus exacerbated by an incentive structure that prevents
quick agreements.
In more general terms the problem of implementing bankruptcy procedures
amounts to choosing a way that maximises the long run value of the enterprise
concerned. The stereotypical case of an SOE during economic transition is one,
where the liquidation value of the firm is below the book value of its
non-performing assets and below the costs of restructuring the enterprise. If,
however, the enterprise survives it may generate a future revenue that enables it
to repay its entire debt. If disputes about the distribution of a firms assets delay
the liquidation process, the situation is likely to be one of "drift", where
managers further decapitalise the enterprise and creditors may never see much of
their money back. The alternatives are either to liquidate the firm swiftly or to
write-off some of its debt, so that the present value of its future income stream is
increased, raising the incentives to restructure the firm. Hence, it makes sense to
40 As we saw in the case of Czech privatisation, the role played by the large commercial
banks in managing investment funds and monitoring the restructuring process in those
enterprises in which they have acquired an important stake leads to rather optimistic
predictions concerning the introduction of a bankruptcy law there.43
write-off enterprise debts before pushing them into liquidation, which is
precisely what Czechoslovakia has been doing. If not all debts can be written
off, banks should be allowed to chose those enterprises most likely to generate a
future income stream, for instance by giving them a global role in voucher
privatisation or by allowing debt equity swaps.
Towards the middle of 1992 there was an increasing recognition in Hungary too
that the role of banks in the financial consolidation of the economy had to be
addressed. Simply enforcing discipline by pushing firms into self-bankruptcy or
liquidation was not enough if the major creditors had no incentives to take an
actively monitoring role in the process. Hence a consolidation scheme was
designed for the commercial banks that would enable them to exchange
uncollectable receivables into government bonds (Abel and Bonin, 1993). The
bonds were to carry an interest equal to the average Treasury Bill yield,
however, 50 per cent of the returns had to be paid as participation fee in the deal.
The maturity of the bond was to be 20 years after which the full face value
would have to be paid back by the bank. The debt conversion applied to loans
before December 1991 with a 50 per cent discount, thereafter bad loans could be
exchanged at 80 per cent of face value. Thus the loans consolidation scheme
resembled its Czechoslovak counterpart of 1991 in many respects, except for the
"balloon" payment at the end. However, it may be argued that, once again,
Hungarian policy makers acted too little and too late. Indeed, of the 14
commercial banks selected for the scheme because they failed to meet the 7.25
per cent capital adequacy ratio, the three largest commercial banks did not
participate (Szanyi, 1993; Budapest Bank, 1993). Arguably this is because,
when inflationary expectations are low and the yield on Treasury Bills falls
below a certain level, the burden of the balloon payment exceeds the net present
value of its expected income stream (Abel and Bonin, 1993). Thus the
Hungarian loan consolidation programme has no write-off element and thus
offers only limited relief.
The danger in the current situation is that Hungary opts for a return to eclectic
reforms. Political criteria, connected to sectoral and regional disparities in
unemployment and the resulting social costs of transition may serve to keep
some SOEs afloat with the aid of public money (Budapest Bank, 1993). Already
13 big public companies have been selected for unconditional debt write-off, i.e.
without any link to a change in ownership or management of the companies
(Szanyi, 1993). If this path is indeed followed political criteria would dominate
economic viability and the Hungarian government it would abolish exactly those44
sanctions against financial misbehaviour that have proven so effective during
1992.
The dilemma for the Hungarian government is that any incentive scheme for
creditors to take an active role in financial restructuring will impose costs on the
budget. Enhancing the monitoring role of banks by linking them closer to
privatisation, such as in the Czechoslovak voucher scheme or by the promotion
of debt-equity swaps will reduce government revenues from the sale of state
assets. Debt write-offs, if they are to effectively improve the banks' capital base,
increase the national debt. However, as the banks are still predominantly in state
ownership their recapitalisation amounts to nothing else but a shift of resources
within the public sector. As this would remove one major obstacle to renewed
investment and ultimately would lead to rising government tax revenues, too,
there is no good reason to delay actions on this front, although Hungary's fiscal
situation is substantially more fragile than that of the Czech Republic. After
three years of transition in Hungary, the challenge for government has become
no less.
CONCLUDING REMARKS:
In this paper we promised an evaluation of the different reform strategies in
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, in particular, in order to gain insights on the
appropriate role of government during the transition from socialism to a market
economy. Specifically, we addressed the issue, whether state intervention in
monitoring the transition process may help to reduce friction in economic
adjustment in the presence of institutional legacies that may distort economic
incentives. The evidence from the two countries supports an active role for
government during the transition. The following lessons may be derived from
our analysis.
First, the Czechoslovak success with keeping down inflation, unemployment,
and budget deficits must at least in part be attributed to specific policy measures.
The conclusion of a general agreement with trade unions that helped to reduce
real wages significantly during the crucial initial phase of adjustment must be
judged an important institutional substitute for a well-functioning labour market.
The willingness of the Czechoslovak and recently Czech authorities to stick to
their tight control of wages as long as the majority of the labour force was still
employed in the state sector has spared the country of the vicious circle of wage
push inflation, rising unemployment, leading to increasing fiscal deficits and
again more inflation. Now that the private sector is growing rapidly enough to45
absorb SOE workers and redundant public servants, adjustment in the labour
market could be left to market forces. Moreover, the control of wages was
combined with strict credit limits to SOEs that prevented them from granting
wage increases even had they wanted to.
Second, direct interventions in labour and capital markets were complemented in
Czechoslovakia by extremely restrictive macroeconomic policies. It may be
argued that this induced domestic demand to undershoot the level necessary for
internal equilibrium. But it was of crucial importance for the eventual success of
Czechoslovakia's stabilisation programme that it never became prone to erratic
policy shifts. Thereby it created a predictable, if harsh environment for
Czechoslovak enterprises. This on the one hand eased the enforcement of direct
controls, while on the other hand it would later prevent moral hazard problems
in the solution of the financial distress associated with the economic crisis. In
sum, the combination of active monitoring of industry during the transition with
a restrictive macroeconomic framework was the basis on which the government
was able to build its reputation of unconditional commitment to reform. The
credibility this entailed for any policy measure automatically improved its
effectiveness and thereby reduced the costs of transition.
Third, the fiscal room created by macroeconomic policies in Czechoslovakia
allowed swift and thorough action in dealing with perverse incentive structures
in capital markets. The legacies of bad debts and the temporary explosion of
inter-enterprise credits were largely brought under control within two years of
the start of transition. This has put Czechoslovakia in the fortunate position of
being able to use interest rate policies in leading the path to recovery. The shift
from passive to active monetary policy in Czechoslovakia was achieved on the
basis of relatively generous and early debt write-offs and a determined move
towards a fundamental change in ownership rights. Hence banks in the Czech
Republic at the end of the first round of voucher privatisation not only posses a
huge outlet for the funds accumulated during the first two years of transition,
their active involvement in the privatisation process through the management of
investment funds also puts them in a controlling position in important parts of
the economy. With further consolidation among the large number of funds
taking place under the influence of competition, universal banking may become
the hallmark of investment-led recovery at least in the Czech Republic.
Fourth, the Hungarian experience does not support the view that eclecticism is
the right policy stance in the transition to a market economy. Inspite of its head
start, Hungary wasted two entire years in which perverse incentive structures, in46
the capital market in particular, led to the proliferation of financial indiscipline.
While this did not prevent some structural adjustment to take place, as is
evidenced by the rapid reorientation of trade, Hungary now pays the price for
previous imprudence as new investments are delayed, interest spreads rise, and
losses multiply. It is important to note that restrictive macroeconomic policies
may not prevent such developments in the absence of sanctions against
misbehaviour. Indeed, the Hungarian experience once again confirms that the
expectations of economic actors about the likelihood of future government help
determines the extent to which they are able to rely on money substitutes. An
active monetary policy is thus first and foremost a matter of government
credibility and predictability. This is hard to square with the recommendation of
trial and error during transition.
Fifth, the enforcement of financial discipline can be achieved relatively quickly
with the introduction of appropriate legislation, containing effective sanctions
against violating payment contracts. The rapid decline in involuntary trade
credits in Hungary bears evidence to the potency of bankruptcy regulations in
establishing financial discipline. However, the costs of enforcing bankruptcy in a
transition economy depend largely on the incentives of the different parties
involved in the process. As long as banks, for instance, are burdened with
non-performing assets any solution that reduces their claims on a firms' assets
without compensation may be unacceptable to them. Moreover, if the returns
from a possible investment to restructure an SOE accrue mainly to the state as
the current owner, the amount of liquidations may by far exceed the level that
would be required on grounds of efficiency. At least a partial debt write-off for
banks and the possibility of debt-equity swaps should be considered as important
measures that help to reduce the costs of enforcing financial discipline. Finally,
the administrative regulations should be made as simple as possible to speed up
the process.
These five lessons can certainly be amended by others. To a certain degree the
Czech Republic was also lucky in inheriting a stable macroeconomy and being
close to the large German market. But while the factor "luck" may be unevenly
distributed it can also easily be wasted by bad policies. Of course, it would be an
exaggeration to point at Czechoslovakia as an unmitigated success story and
characterise Hungary as a problem child in Central and Eastern Europe.
However, if one takes foreign capital inflows as a proxy for the shifting
perceptions abroad of which of the three Central European countries is currently
ahead with economic reforms, Hungary seems to have lost ground at least47
against the Czech Republic.
4
1 Hence our positive assessment of the latter
country's economic policies seems to be not so far off the mark. In conclusion
we may thus reiterate the central point of the paper. In the transition from
socialism to the market governments can and must do more than react
eclectically to developments in the economy. The question for policy makers is
not whether to intervene at all, but how to counteract market imperfections in a
way that makes precisely those interventions less and less necessary.
According to PlanEcon (1993) by the second half over 1992 Foreign direct Investment
(FDI) into the Czech Republic reached $ 420 million per quarter, compared to Hungary's $
480 million. In 1991, Czechoslovakia's total FDI inflow was one third of Hungary's.48
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